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The present-day economic and financial crisis (depression) appears 
unprecedented in the last half century. The international financial crisis has 
been extended to the Romanian economy. However, in terms of direct impact, 
the Romanian banking system was less affected by not being exposed to toxic 
assets, and because of prudential and administrative measures taken by the 
NBR. 
Indirectly, however, the international financial crisis and especially its 
obvious consequence – the recession in developed countries - has expanded to 
the Romanian economy, on several channels. The shopping channel slowed 
export growth and even reduced them. The financial channel has limited the 
access to external financing, and thus restricted the lending volume, generating 
private external debt service difficulties. 
On the exchange rate channel, the reduction in external financing reflected 
in national currency depreciation. On the confidence channel, there was a 
withdrawal of investors from Eastern Europe countries. 
Among the measures adopted by the central bank, the most notable were 
targeting inflation and currency interventions. By adopting inflation targeting, 
the central bank opted to make more room in establishing foreign exchange 
market, and after the onset of the current international financial crisis, including 
the 2009-2010, adopted a controlled floating exchange rate. This does not mean 
intervention in the forex market on a discretionary basis. 
NBR policy on foreign exchange intervention has been guided by the 
philosophy that high exchange rate volatility is harmful for both the inflation 
target and the financial health of the real and financial sector. 
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The scientific communication is a measure related to the drives of the 
international financial crisis, mainly the one in Romania. They are of macro-
economic and micro-economic nature, as specialists like Altman (2008) and 
Blachard (2009) pointed out. 
 220 
The profound reason of the international financial crisis has been the 
abundant amount of cash created by the main world banks (FED, BOJ) and the 
desire of the oil-exporting countries to limit the currency appreciation. 
Likewise, there was an oversaturation with savings, derived from the surging 
integration into the global economy of some countries (China, South-Eastern Asia) 
with high accrual rates, and also a global distribution of the assets and income to 
the goods exporting countries (oil, natural gas, etc.) 
A series of micro-economic causes seemed menacing in this environment, 
namely the rational externalizations from a private point of view, but socially 
insufficient, and the international competition, known for de-regulations. 
The issue under scrutiny is important, as the international crisis has affected 
Romania too at various levels: commercial, financial, exchange rate and, last but 
not least, the trust – the European investors have withdrawn from our system. 
The paper will continue with presenting the RNB measures that have been 
adopted, in order to lower the impact of the crisis upon the currency and the 
monetary system – the most crucial is the inflation and the foreign currency 
interventions. 
The author gives his opinions about the RNB policy, mainly in agreement 
with them, but also states his personal views, supported by pertinent arguments. 
 
2. Specialist literature 
The works in this field are indeed diversified and, most of the time, sides 
with the topic, as a result of its interests, proven by how the specialists put down or 
praise the RNB policy. 
One thing is certain: during this harsh time of a profound economic and 
financial crisis, including the post-1989 interval, RNB has proved itself as a stable 
pillar (especially by its foreign currency policy), able to involve in limiting the 
crisis effects upon the national economy. 
 
3. The content of the article 
The present financial and economic crisis seems to have no parity for the last 
half century. The economic recession has expanded to the USA, Europe and Japan 
and it models as even more painful than the economic downturn in 1981-1982. A 
massive trust drop at both the business and the consumers’ level, translated into 
expenses lowering, is in full swing. The government of USA and some executive 
bodies in Europe, have nationalized parts of their financial sectors, in their attempt 
to regain stability, a contradiction for the modern capitalism. The entire world 
seems to go a different direction, where the state role will be higher than the private 
sector’s. 
Many people believe that the current financial crisis is rooted in the dramatic 
fall of the housing price in the USA or of the credit market for housing. This vision 
is quite incomplete. The fundamental causes of the financial crisis are even deeper, 
macroeconomic and microeconomic in nature, as specialists think: Altman (2010), 
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Blanchard (2009). The two types of causes have intertwined in bringing about the 
crisis.  
The profound reason of the international financial crisis has been the 
abundant amount of cash created by the main world banks (FED, BOJ) and the 
desire of the oil-exporting countries to limit the currency appreciation. Likewise, 
there was an oversaturation with savings, derived from the surging integration into 
the global economy of some countries (China, South-Eastern Asia) with high 
accrual rates, and also a global distribution of the assets and income to the 
countries exporting goods (oil, natural gas, etc.) The plenty amount of cash and the 
oversaturation with savings have generated resources available for investments, 
including sophisticated financial tools, which some investors do not grasp very 
easily. 
The consequences of all that cash were the very low interest rates and their 
reduced volatility. Together, such consequences have triggered desire for assets 
with great earnings. Plus, the low volatility on the market has created the trend of 
under-estimating the risk and a true lack of vigilance on the investors’ side. 
The risk margins have also been very low and non-discriminatory. All these, 
the low interest rates, the appetite for assets with great earnings, the lack of 
vigilance towards risk and the small margins have somehow hidden the signals of 
prices on the financial markets and brought not enough understanding of the risks 
involved. 
The consequence of the frantic securitization was that, once the crisis derived 
from failing in payment of the credit instalments for housing, the financial market 
became non-transparent. The investors’ distrust has quickly placed the titles issued 
by the special vehicles (VSP) in the high-risk category (the quality of the assets 
being finances was not clear anymore) and the refinancing has become impossible. 
Due to the difference between the maturities on assets and liabilities, these VSP 
have started relying on financing lines from the sponsoring banks. Lastly, the 
liquidity request, along with the lack of trust in banks, has triggered the cash rush 
and, therefore, the actual interest rate has started going up. 
In a nutshell, the main challenge is to find the solutions to re-establish the 
trust of the investors and consumers. 
On a long term, the core issue is to adjust the principles guiding the reform of 
the international financial system, mainly referring to transparency, improvement 
of the regulations concerning the titles accounting, assurance of the financial 
markets integrity (in terms of market manipulation and fraud) and strengthening 
the cooperation among the financial institutions in the world (the updating of the 
IMF and World Bank governance structures). The business ethics is still on this 
list. 
The international financial crisis has also touched the Romanian economy. 
Still, from the point of view of direct impact, the Romanian banking system was 
not deeply affected, as it had no exposure to toxic assets, due to the prudential and 
administrative measures adopted by the RNB. 
But, indirectly, the international financial crisis and its obvious outcome – the 
recession in the developed countries – has extended upon the Romanian economy 
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on various channels. For the commercial channel – exports have slowed down. The 
financial channel – access to foreign financing has been limited, therefore the 
crediting volume has reduced, generating difficulties in the private foreign debt 
service. As for the exchange rate, the lowering of the foreign financing has 
reflected into the depreciation of the national currency. For the trust, the investors 
have withdrawn from the eastern European countries. 
The result was the emergence of panic and speculative attacks on the 
currency market (see the one in October in Romania, which required the RNB 
intervention). Finally, for the channel of wealth and balance effects, the net assets 
of population and companies have lowered, as a consequence of the increased 
percentage of foreign-based credits (correlated with the national currency 
depreciation) and of prices decreasing for the estate assets from speculative, non-
sustainable values (‘bubble’ type). 
The spread of such effects makes the uncertainty degree of the economic 
variables evolutions be extremely high. Therefore, the crisis is being increasing the 
diligence degree at the level of consumers and economic agents. 
In Romania, the answer to the crisis adverse effects cannot be similar to the 
one in other European state or the USA. There are differences among these 
economies, which do not simply allow copying the measures packages from one 
country to another. In essence, we are talking about the fact that the Romanian 
economy has a large deficit of the checking account, which indicates its 
dependence on the foreign financing. We do have to choose between the orderly 
reduction of this deficit or its reduction via the market within this mistrustful and 
diffidence environment, with dramatic consequences for the exchange rate and the 
economic improvement. 
Even if the development of the economic landing process cannot be planned in 
detail, the promotion of several coherent and credible economic policies might 
prevent from a hard landing. Thus, the government should avoid an emotional 
approach of the crisis, under the pressure of labor unions and patronages, which 
would lead to adopting some measures of stimulating the internal demand, and 
making more complicated the action of bringing the checking account deficit to a 
sustainable level. It is only a concentration of the combination among 
macroeconomic policies on the landing process of the foreign imbalance (the 
checking account deficit) and internal (budget deficit) that may support a soft 
adjustment of the economy and an improvement of the foreign investors’ perception. 
In essence, it is necessary to have a significant strengthening of the fiscal and 
wage policy (to a large extent, it includes the bonuses and the quasi-salary awards). 
To this purpose, the 2010 budget, recently approved, is a wonderful step 
taken, mainly due to the distribution of some relatively high funds for investments 
that have the potential to create ‘spill over effects’ upon the other sectors in 
economy. As it is being implemented, the possibility of gradual relaxation of 
monetary policy will emerge. Thus, a sub-optimal combination for the last years 
(less severe budget and wage salaries, i.e. a very ‘tight’ monetary policy) will be 
replaced with an optimal combination where all the policies (budget, wage and 
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monetary) have a similar restriction degree and take to the economic activity to 
labour and productivity. 
Moreover, the government may also contribute to the improvement of how 
the foreign investors perceive the situation, by measures aiming the enhancement 
of absorption ability of the European funds and the replacement of the private 
foreign financing with public foreign financing or by creating new employment 
places in underserved fields (infrastructure, tourism, agrifood) that will later turn 
into the engine of the economic growth. Generally speaking, the conclusion of 
several financial contracts with international organisms, starting with the European 
Commission and the European Bank of Investments, which will cooperate in order 
to greatly diminish the private capital input is very welcomed. 
If all these steps are going to be followed, there is a high probability that the 
investors improve their opinion about Romania and prefer investing here rather 
than somewhere else in Central or Eastern Europe. The high probability does not 
equal certainty: it is quite impossible to avoid the scenario where the foreign 
investors will not react positively and they will still treat Romania discriminatorily, 
even if the local authorities are doing the right thing. But the awareness about such 
possibility should not lead to abandoning the so-necessary landing measures. 
A danger in implementing a such coherent strategy of orderly adjustment of 
the foreign imbalance is in the more and more gloomy forecasting, issued by 
various institutions in regards to the economic upturn in the 2010 Romania, even to 
predict a negative increase. The real threat is the fact that the political factor, upon 
believing such forecasting, might handle the issue in an emotional way and adopt 
measures of fiscal and wage easing, which only worsen the crisis. 
Even if it is obvious that some areas, former drives for the economic progress 
until 2009 (real estate, financial-banking, car imports, metallurgy industry, 
chemical industry, car building industry) will witness a decrease in 2010, there are 
still some, like IT, telecommunications, food and pharmaceutical industry, public 
services) that may see some growth. At the same time, we need to consider an 
effort of regaining the consumers’ trust in the economy progress, trust that was 
dramatically lost (as shown by the trust indicator in economy, published by EC), 
due to an emotional handling of the crisis.  
As a conclusion, the private sector has already reduced the last year external 
deficit, which still stays high. The prediction is that the adjustment will be constant 
in 2010 as well. Similarly, the fiscal policy has been procyclical and contributed to 
the deepening of the external deficit of the Romanian economy. Right now, we 
need several measures that will provide an orderly adjustment cutback of the 
checking account deficit to sustainable levels, by reducing the budget deficit and a 
better adjustment of the policies mix to the limits of deficits. The percentage of the 
public expenses for investments should go up. 
Likewise, the absorption of the European funds and adoption of financing 
agreements with international organisms (European Commission and the European 
Central Bank) should be looked closer at. The private sector needs to re-establish 
the relation between the wages and labour productivity, which will provide foreign 
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competitiveness. Such policies will decrease uncertainty and will give back the 
trust in the future of economy. 
Among the measures adopted by the RNB, the inflation targeting and the 
currency interventions are worthwhile to mention. 
The option for adopting the inflation targeting has been justified by the need 
to achieve a sustainable disinflation. The implementation of the inflation targeting 
strategy has not been easy either before the emergence of the financial crisis, when 
the massive capital input, the position of net debtor of RNB towards the banking 
system and the mechanism of the monetary policy distribution have combined 
themselves and thus, between 2005 and 2007, there was a co-existence between 
inflationist forecast and currency strong appreciation. This was a serious issued for 
the central bank. The Increase of the interest rates, required to bring the 
anticipations in line with the inflation target, was attracting even more foreign 
capital, making the national currency more appreciated. 
Since July 2007, along with the financial crisis, some of these requirements 
have disappeared. Today, RNB has the tendency to be a net creditor of the banking 
system, and the foreign capital input has slowed down a lot. But this will not make 
the monetary policy simpler. On the contrary, the financial crisis has increased the 
volatility on the monetary and currency market and had the tendency to amplify the 
deceleration of the economic activity. On the one hand, the reduction of the 
external financing and the existence of the high foreign imbalance have triggered 
the national currency depreciation, which fuels the inflation and makes necessary a 
relatively high interest rate. Moreover, the people with debts in EUR or other 
currencies are vulnerable to a significant depreciation of the national currency. On 
the other hand, higher interest rates would tend to prevent the economic growth and 
more, it would create costs for the people in debt, thus risking to unbalance the 
financial sector.  
In these circumstances, the issue of the compromise between the monetary 
policy objectives emerges: the assurance of the prices stability and of the financial 
stability. 
Phelps (1968) has shown that there is no long-term compromise between 
inflation and unemployment. Hence, the long-term objective of the monetary 
policy has to be reaching a low and stable inflation. One has noticed that the low 
and stable inflation helps the sustainable economic growth on a long term. 
Therefore, the low and stable inflation represents a purpose per se and a means of 
achieving a sustainable economic growth.  
The efficiency of the monetary policy in reaching this objective is limited 
though, unless there is a financial stability. One of the basic macro-economic 
principles has stated that the divergence in the financial area substantially 
influences the business cycle. Today, this thing is obvious worldwide. The world 
central banks attempt to maintain the financial stability and avoid the recession and 
the economic depression. 
The previous experiences seem to confirm the opinion that inflation is the 
main source of financial instability. On a usual basis, high inflation intervals are 
characterized by severe financial instability and banking system crises or followed 
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by recession – as the authorities have adopted inappropriate measures of inflation 
smoothing. 
Still, the recent specialist literature highlights the fact that a low inflation 
level is not a sufficient requirement to provide a long-term financial stability 
(Crockett, 2003). For the present economies, a low and stable inflation level has led 
to a new economic climate, which requires a thorough rethinking of the relation 
between the prices stability and the financial stability. To this purpose, the 
experience of several countries in Asia between 1997 and 1998 and the current 
economic and financial crisis are taking us to the reconsideration of the measure 
where the central bank holds the ability to provide a simultaneous stability of 
prices and financial one, where hypothetically speaking their achieving requires the 
adoption of contradictory measures. 
The experience of Romania shows that the financial stability has a special 
importance in the prices setting. Romania has been deservedly criticised for delays 
in disinflation, due to the insufficient structural reforms. Our country had an 
average disinflation rate of 5.8% per year for 2000-2007, in parallel with 
maintaining the stability of the financial system. If RNB would have covered this 
lack of reforms by steeper increase of the interest rates, the companies’ and 
households’ financial situation would have deteriorated. And so would have the 
banking system. Lastly, the disinflation pace itself would have been smaller than 
the one being achieved. The lesson that we should learn is that, on a long term, the 
inability of maintaining the financial stability will only lead to a reinflaming of the 
inflation. 
Upon adopting the inflation targeting, RNB has opted to make a larger room 
in setting the exchange rate. Still, there were times when the leu fluctuations were 
way outside the limits justified by the exchange rate fundamentals. This thing 
happened after the present international financial crisis emerged, including 2010. 
These are the reasons why RNB has adopted a controlled push-up of the 
exchange rate, which is not similar to the discretionary intervention on the currency 
market. 
The RNB policy concerning the interventions on the currency market has 
been guided by the philosophy that a high volatility of the exchange rate is 
dangerous both for the inflation-related objective as well as for the financial health 
of the real and financial sectors. 
Following this philosophy, RNB has promoted a fluctuant exchange rate, 
which allowed it to use the free market valences and to discourage the speculative 
behaviours and avoid the excessive appreciations. 
The consistent implementation of such philosophy required from RNB a 
relatively important currency purchase from the market for the 2004-August 2007 
interval. Upon the currency purchase, RNB was criticised for not letting the rate 
appreciate in step with the market requirements. Today, this step proved to be right. 
The current financial crisis has introduced a steep inversion of the leu appreciation 
trend, with noteworthy episodes of volatility. As it happened in the past – the 
currency input over-appreciated the leu much more over the level indicated by the 
fundamental factors of the exchange rate, so did today – the decrease of the foreign 
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financing and uncertainty are prone to determine the leu depreciation, not justified 
by the fundamental factors of the exchange rate. 
The reserves that have been bought on the currency market during the over-
appreciation moments are now useful for slowing down the leu depreciation. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Even the world economic growth continues, the dangers are still ahead. The 
effects of the profound crisis that affected Greece seem to impact the debts of the 
European states in arrears but going up and place in doubt the stability of the entire 
European Monetary Union. 
The so-called contagion of the public debt crisis among the PIIGGS countries 
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Great Britain and Spain) worries Washington and 
Tokyo, the deepest in debt non-European governments. The EUR exchange rate 
has had a new depreciation and the international investors have withdrawn their 
money in Europe. 
The critical situation of the EUR zone is the consequence of the so-called 
anti-crisis policies adopted by the European governments in the last two years. 
These governments have large budget deficits and public debt level, i.e the most 
vulnerable macroeconomic imbalance on the continent. As characterized by an 
overweight welfare state, a low productivity, asset bubbles, high current account 
deficit and a non-sustainable increase of the governmental expenses, the PIIGGS 
countries seemed to be, on the verge of crisis, in a situation somewhat similar to 
the EU member states (macro/economically speaking) in Eastern Europe. Still, the 
membership to the EUR zone or the traditional trust of the market in the London 
government economic wisdom, have succeeded to hide all these weaknesses of the 
PIIGGS countries. But, once the economic crisis begun, the macro-economic 
stability of these countries was shattered, as a result of the Keynes policies 
resuscitation of ‚fiscal stimulation’.  
Even though the public expenses in use were already non-sustainable, the 
governments in the PIIGGS countries simply wrote down the losses in the private 
sector into the public sector, concluding that the entire crisis is only a sin of 
capitalism, nonchalantly overlooking the ‘obsolete’ rules mentioned in the Stability 
pact 20 years ago. Thus, the private sector in great debt, on the verge of 
bankruptcy, has been substituted by a public sector in a similar situation. 
The EUR zone is now in an unprecedented situation and risks an implosion. 
The states with a better financial situation have to save from bankruptcy the ones 
that are about to be declared insolvent, and BCE – opposed to its own status – 
might have to turn to a direct monetization of the budget deficits. 
The RNB representatives appreciate that Romania has continued to register 
an economic downturn for the first 3 months of this year, the main challenge for 
the economy being the budget deficit that needs to be lowered by speeding up the 
structural adjustments. Mugur Isarescu, the Governor, says that the economy 
recovery is not desirable, as long as the public sector fails to reduce the enormous 
deficit, either via drastic expenses cuts or taxes increase. This speaks indirectly 
 227
about the need of implementing harsh measures of costs decrease by layoffs and 
cost cuts in the public sector. 
The cuts in the public sector employees’ salaries by 25% since June 1st, the 
decrease in the unemployment benefits and pensions by 15%, the dramatic 
lowering of the budget subventions, these are the main reform measures that the 
government has used to persuade IMF to drop the VAT and the single quote 
increase – where these reforms supplement the monetary policy measures of RNB 
with the purpose to go back to an economic progress, to reduce the deficit and to 
have Romania come out of recession. 
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